Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. 
The tools Hussein planned to employ to achieve this third objective were his army, to achieve victory on the ground, then his diplomatic arm, by retaining his gains at the negotiation table.
Additionally, he hoped to exploit his economic tools once he had increased the security of his oil trade through the Gulf.
Plan of Action and Why it Changed over Time
Hussein created a strategic plan that intertwined his fears and goals, but was hampered by shortsightedness. Hussein planned first to secure his economic viability by acquiring the Shatt al- 
Assessment as a Statesman
Hussein, as commander and statesman, attempted a planned military action followed by diplomatic efforts to achieve limited goals and enhance his security. However, when his military action failed to gain his territorial objectives, he shifted to political overtures to gain Arab and international support. As he gained support, he consolidated his power. Hussein initially miscalculated Iranian resolve and military capability, delaying the conclusion of a "limited" war for nearly a decade. However, ultimately, Hussein was able to manipulate world opinion and erode Iranian will to conclude the conflict while retaining his secure hold on power.
By using poison gas selectively on the Iranians, and promoting himself as representing respectively. Clausewitz saw the conduct of war as a balance between these three spheres.
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As a despot, Hussein retained the roles of both the government and the commander. This was an inherently tenuous position as he was in a minority group and needed to retain power through tight controls on his military. Therefore, the policy was war-and when the war did not achieve his initially envisioned objectives, the war itself eventually became the policy. Hussein's means became his end. For example, after stagnation and defeats on the battlefield, Hussein changed his strategy in an attempt to break the stalemate. His new way of fighting eventually became an attempt to directly affect the will of the Iranian people by employing missiles designed to provoke fear rather than to achieve battlefield objectives. Hussein, because he dominated the realms of the commander and the government, had the opportunity to change the character of the war, by attacking civilians, and the conduct, by employing missiles and gas. As 
Centers of Gravity and Shifting Perspectives
Hussein originally believed the Ayatollah's tenuous hold on power and the Iranian army were the key centers of gravity. In his rapid assault, Hussein expected to overwhelm both centers through surprise, concentration, and mass. Afterwards, Hussein could simply defend the newly acquired Shatt al-Arab waterway and sue for peace. During the early course of the conflict, however, the Iraqis made tactical blunders while the Iranian's were successful in fielding huge numbers of poorly trained martyrs who were successful in blunting subsequent Iraqi assaults.
Additionally, though the Ayatollah's control was tenuous at first, due to popular unrest, Hussein's attack helped the Ayatollah consolidate power. This strengthened the Iranian resolve to fight. 15 The result was a stagnation of the battle, which caused Hussein to change his military strategy from seizing the initiative to fighting a strategic, defensive war. 16 Hussein, when on defense, changed his view of centers of gravity after coming to the realization that negotiations were not imminent. Hussein began believing that the Iranian will was a feasible center of gravity. To affect this new center of gravity, Hussein expanded his military objectives to include naval warfare, the interdiction of merchant shipping in 1984, employing poison gas, and missile strikes against civilian targets in Iran, all deliberate escalatory moves. He apparently hoped that huge battlefield losses, stories of gas attacks, and strikes Because of Hussein's initially limited goals, he chose not to attempt to destroy the Iranian army outright. Evidence of this limited strategy was that Hussein, at the outset of his venture, provided only five divisions, less than half his force, to engage in southwestern Iran. 21 His mistaken assumption was that the Iranian leadership would not want to increase their vulnerability through sustained combat. 22 The objectives of obtaining a small gain in territory appeared achievable based on a purely military comparison of assumed Iranian capabilities, particularly after losing US military support. To achieve his limited ends, Hussein envisioned using primarily counterforce attacks to avoid threatening the Iranian revolutionary regime directly. of whom were civilians. 30 The effect desired was not only to kill Kurds but also to elicit fear and compliance within his borders.
Like his use of ground and chemical forces, Hussein's use of air power also changed during the course of the war. Though Iraq maintained air superiority, both countries appeared to value their fixed wing air forces more as "fleets in being" than useful coordinated service arms. It appears both sides perceived their air forces to be more useful as deterrents than as actual combat elements, fearing to risk them through frequent use in battle. 31 Though Iraq and Iran doctrinally professed that the primary mission of the air force was to assist the army, they rarely used aircraft to support ground operations due to the risk of losing their limited number of aircraft.
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Since Hussein considered his aircraft and his few capable, Soviet-trained, pilots high-value resources, he turned to missiles as a viable and less costly air power option.
Iran reached its culminating point in 1987 after spending its forces against strongly held Indeed, this attack on the cities turned out to be the straw that broke Iranian morale. With government employees joining citizens in fleeing Tehran en masse, the regime was paralyzed and national morale was shattered to the core. The road from there to total collapse of the military's fighting spirit was short. 36 Hussein envisioned a quick, limited conflict with Iran accompanied by repression of internal rebellious factions. His initial strategy was to gain land, prestige, and power through a short war. Hussein first assumed that Iranian forces, still reeling from the revolutionary decapitation of the military leadership, would crumble allowing him to sweep-in and secure
territory. This would also weaken the Iranian grip on the Shia in southern Iraq. He believed this concept achievable because he predicted vulnerability in the Iranian centers of gravity, poorly led fielded forces and an unstable new Islamic regime. Unfortunately for Hussein, he actually put the Iranian leadership in a situation similar to his own, and found it difficult to fight a limited war when his adversary perceived their survival was at stake. 37 Hussein underestimated the power of the revolutionary regime in Iran and the Iranian people's morale. Additionally, Hussein focused on the threat to his own loss of power while failing to accurately interpret the nature of the Iranian revolution. 38 These factors, along with early Iraqi military ineptitude, resulted in the war's stagnation. 39 Because of his lack of constraints, Hussein was willing to escalate, changing the character and conduct of the war well beyond his original intent, until the will of the Iranians faltered.
Indeed, Hussein was able to retain power by changing his strategy through escalation.
However, his ability to successfully shelter his civilian population from much of the economic stress of the war enabled him to concentrate on repressing the Kurds and Shia without risking the spread of unrest. Hussein was further able to tighten his grip on power domestically by using extreme measures to repress internal opposition, such as gas attacks. Perhaps Hussein's recognition that Iran was faltering and in danger of losing its will to fight in 1988 contributed to his calculus to escalate in his ultimately successful missile war.
The primary benefit of the war for Hussein was his consolidation of personal power.
Hussein was able to claim a major success after eight years of war, despite his disassociated strategies. His most serious risks were due to his initial miscalculations in Iranian fervor, resulting in the stalemate from 1981-1987. The risk was not just the external threat of a defeat by
Iran, but also his internal threat. The ultimate result of Hussein's miscalculation in assessing the Iranian capability and will was the cost of several hundred thousand lives.
In some respects, the Ayatollah was Iran's own enemy, chiefly by reducing Iran's chance of success through purging its professional military leadership while alienating itself from most of the world during the Iranian hostage situation. These Iranian disconnects between strategy and actions proved detrimental, though Iranian efforts in the Gulf and selected mass offensives did achieve some limited, temporary gains. Finally, the Iranians could not keep up with Hussein's evolving escalatory strategy. Ultimately, because of the need to retain popular support for the Islamic revolution, the Ayatollah was sensitive to the population's loss of will.
In the end, although his human and material costs were high, Hussein achieved some significant political gains. He successfully portrayed himself as "the reasonable and progressive Of course, Hussein failed to learn the lesson that calculating resolve and judging the kind of war on which he was embarking was critical before engaging in battle. His 1990 foray into Kuwait again demonstrated that lack of cognizance. Yet, somehow, he remains in power.
